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This article examines the rise and decline of tripartite experiments in southern Africa,
focusing on South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia, where tripartism emerged as part
of the broader processes of democratisation and embedding democratic institutions.
Why did these experiments largely fail to achieve the gains for labour that might have
been anticipated? In each case, the lack of success can be ascribed to the ecosystemic
dominance of neo-liberalism, returning growth fuelled by higher commodities prices,
the changing structure of elites, dominant partyism, and structural weaknesses in both
organised business and the labour movement.
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Introduction
This article evaluates tripartite experiments in three neighbouring southern African
countries, South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique, focusing on the years 1994–2013, but
taking into account key features of broader socio-economic history. In covering the
historical trajectory underlying the tripartite experiments, it explores why tripartism was
instituted and what it consisted of, the indicators of its decline, and why this occurred. This
analysis helps to address the important question of why these experiments largely failed to
achieve the gains for labour that might have been anticipated. The findings of this article
have broader import, given ongoing concerns within Africa in relation to job insecurity,
inequality, social stability, and distributive matters.
Literature review: origins and challenges of tripartism
Important distinctions can be drawn between tripartism and neo-corporatism.1 Neo-
corporatism seeks to reconcile the interests of competing class interest groupings in
society, implying compromise and deal making between capital and labour, with the state
adding the resources and regulations necessary to make deals viable and durable, in order
to provide the basis for sustainable growth.2 Tripartism can be defined as a somewhat
ambitious manifestation of neo-corporatism, in that the partners are drawn together in
setting macro-economic policy, aiming to encourage consensus, fairness and equity, and
consequently overcome potentially ruinous class conflicts, and foster social and economic
progress.3 In embedding participation by broadly based interest groupings, tripartism can
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potentially preclude a drift toward authoritarianism and underpin a broadly legitimate
social order.4 These features are especially pertinent to each of South Africa, Namibia and
Mozambique, since they were marked by long liberation struggles, and in the case of
Mozambique, subsequent civil war: tripartism could potentially help to overcome the
bitter social divisions of the past.
However, as Olson has noted,5 tripartite deals only work if partners are broadly
encompassing and are capable of reining in their rank and file. In other words, tripartism is
only likely when the ‘intermediary organisations’ of capital and labour retain a broad
base.6 When Olson wrote this around 30 years ago, organised labour represented a
significant majority of the employed within many developed societies. However, although
in South Africa at the close of apartheid the labour movement encompassed the majority of
formal sector workers outside of agriculture and small business employees, the social base
of the Mozambican and Namibian labour movement was always narrower. In countries
with large informal sectors and high unemployment, the main threat to tripartism may not
be separations within the traditional working class, but the ‘precariat’, whose interests are
unlikely to be taken into account in neo-corporatist deal-making.7 At the same time, the
rural-urban divide is often much more pronounced than in developed societies in terms of
prosperity and political importance,8 albeit with links between urban and rural workers
through informal extended networks of support.9 Unions in countries such as South Africa
arguably constitute a present day aristocracy of labour,10 yet it is overly simplistic to
assume that they ignore the needs of marginalised workers, given the strength and tenacity
of such networks in the absence of comprehensive welfare coverage.11 Hence,
accommodations between state, business and the urban working class may provide an
important basis for stability, even if they do not formally encompass those on the
periphery.
A more serious threat to tripartism might be limitations in the representativeness
of organised business. Here, challenges include reconciling the interests of smaller
employers and their larger (often unionised) counterparts;12 the interests of the former may
be discounted in deal making, undermining the legitimacy of, and support for deals.
If anticipated gains are not achieved, either through not addressing the interests of all
members, or through a lack of negotiating capacities, this might result in disenchantment
from members. Furthermore, the complexity and dynamics of an internationally open
economy may limit the possibilities for coordination through corporatist negotiations and
structures.
As noted above, neo-corporatist deal making also depends on active state support.13
However, governments have become increasingly reluctant to support such deal-making,
reflecting the dominance of a neo-liberal ideology at the national and international level
amongst global policy elites.14 Whilst the influence of supra-national institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and large financial institutions
remains uneven, such players have often put severe constraints on national governments in
the developing world, preventing them from pursuing alternatives to neo-liberalism, and
powerful businesses have been emboldened to pursue short-term strategies that limit the
involvement of organisations representing labour. This influence cannot, of course, wholly
explain why elites within government have become increasingly responsive to the interests
of specific categories of short-termist investors rather than society as a whole. However,
one explanation is that contemporary political elites worldwide are invariably composed
of militarists, merchants/capitalists and intellectuals.15 Whilst intellectuals are most
likely to pursue class compromises, hegemony by either of the former groups can lead
to a narrow pursuit of sectional interests in government policy formulation.16 In southern
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Africa, liberation movements enjoyed a strong intellectual base, but in recent years,
prominent politicians have become increasingly concerned with their own business
interests. Moreover, where politicians have been reluctant or unwilling to deal with
structural social problems, and have merely sought to campaign on small-scale policy
changes and sound-bites, they have become reliant on technocrats.17 In turn, these
technocrats have in many cases been co-opted by financial elites.18 All this, as Streeck
suggests, has made for a growing failure by the political classes to rein in or mediate
unrestrained market forces.19 Finally, as Pagano and Volpin note, class compromises have
tended to occur where there have been proportional electoral systems, since national
governments have had to engage in coalition building that includes various sectional
interests.20 All three countries under review have proportional systems. However, in each
case, these systems are characterised by dominant partyism. In such instances, coalition
building is likely to be subsumed within the ruling party, and therefore supporters of a
(in this case internal) coalition partner are less able to punish it for perceived failures
via the normal electoral process. In turn, this may result in poor quality politics which are
personality centred and lack depth.21
In summary, in southern Africa, given the post-conflict context, it might be expected
that tripartite deal making has been largely impelled by a desire to shore up political
transitions and broaden the basis of social consensus, while economic growth was an
important but secondary concern. It might also be assumed that employer support for
tripartism might help in negotiating legitimate departures from the increasingly pressing
neo-liberal orthodoxy of International Financial Institutions and potential investors.
However, as outlined in the following sections, the situation has been more complicated
than this within the three countries under study.
South Africa’s corporatist moment and how it passed
The South African labour movement has arguably been the largest and best-resourced
in Africa.22 It also played a central role in the struggle for democratisation, imparting it
with political legitimacy. Yet, although some tripartite institutional features persist,
South Africa’s neo-corporatist moment has passed, reflecting structural changes in the
South African political economy and long term shifts in the global ecosystem.
There is an extensive literature on the South African union movement.23 However,
it is worth reiterating some of the key features and trends. The first is that up until the early
1970s, attempts to organise African workers relied too heavily on a small number of
activists, while white dominated unions, after spectacular outbreaks of militancy,24 were
gradually co-opted. Secondly, an initial focus was on grassroots accountability rather than
political engagement.25 However, the post 1976 Soweto uprising and wave of repression
proved highly damaging, and a more overtly political strand of unionism emerged.26 These
two strands were united with the launch of the COSATU federation in 1985, which
represented the overwhelming majority of union members. By the end of the 1990s, union
density among non-agricultural workers had reached almost 40%.27 Although this figure is
relatively high compared to other countries it should be noted that 60% of workers
remained unorganised, and most worked for smaller employers. This limited the social
foundations and legitimacy of any deals.
In an attempt to politically incorporate the unions, the apartheid government adopted
the Wiehahn Commission-recommended reforms over the years 1979–1981,28 thus
including black workers in industry wide collective bargaining and establishing an
industrial court to adjudicate labour disputes.29 Yet, independent unions remained
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militant, reflecting the apartheid state’s inability to politically incorporate the unions;30
black workers faced the daily indignities of apartheid both at the workplace and in
the community. The responses of employers to the rise of the unions were mixed.
Some employers chose to recognise unions and engage with them, finding workable
compromises,31 but other more conservative employers resisted the changes. The
apartheid government was confronted with a mass insurrection from 1983 onwards, at the
same time that the strike rate within firms soared.32 In response, the government looked
to roll back the reforms with the 1987 Labour Relations Act amendments, which sought to
curtail basic worker rights.33 Mining and public sector unions subsequently engaged in
industrial action, with mixed results.34 Further state repression under successive States of
Emergency from the mid-1980s onwards re-imposed social order but failed to resolve
workplace tensions.35 Apartheid had enriched Afrikaans-owned business.36 However,
businesses struggled with the fall of the gold price in the 1980s, forcing a reduction
in protectionism and active industrial policies, and waves of shopfloor resistance.37
In February 1990, then President F.W. De Klerck lifted a wide range of apartheid measures
and commenced negotiations leading to democratic elections in 1994, which the principal
black opposition movement, the African National Congress (ANC), by now an alliance
partner of COSATU, won.
In South Africa, various factors therefore contributed toward the move toward
tripartism. Labour, business and state all had a strong interest in a tripartite settlement by
the close of the 1980s. The unions were in favour of tripartism due firstly to concerns with
increasing job losses and radical grassroots pressures, and the need to consolidate their
national role. Under high apartheid, active industrial policies had nurtured labour
intensive, inefficient manufacturing firms; these included protective tariffs, and subsidies
and tax concessions for firms setting up within or adjacent to the bantustans, the latter in an
attempt to lure black workers away from the cities.38 By the late 1980s, it was clear that
tariff liberalisation was inevitable, placing many jobs at risk. In addition, employers had
moved toward leaner staffing;39 wholesale job losses had led to significant membership
declines in key affiliates, such as the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa.
Secondly, mainstream unions faced the threat of radical breakaways.40 Whilst centralised
agreements on complex issues of national economic policy might further have undermined
the ties between leadership and grassroots, it was hoped that the gains might make
splinter unionism unattractive. Meanwhile, businesses were concerned by the growing
ungovernability of workplaces and the unworkability of the 1987 Labour Relations Act
amendments. Many major employers, such as Daimler-Benz, faced the challenge of
operating plants where large areas of the shop floor had been rendered no-go areas for
managers.41 More broadly speaking, there was a desire by employers to distance
themselves from past complicity or support for the failed apartheid order, and legitimise
their role and status in the post-apartheid era. More far sighted employers set a strong
premium on the need for political stability, even if it meant compromising their interests.42
From the government perspective, there was commitment to negotiated outcomes, and
a recognised need to reconcile the interests of diverse stakeholders in order to achieve
competitiveness, but above all, to bring about social stability, and secure broad backing for
the new institutional arrangements.
In practical terms, tripartism involved various measures. In 1994 the National
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was established by legislation,
and formally launched in 1995. This was a tripartite forum with the brief of promoting
sustainable growth, stakeholder participation, and fairness and equity at the workplace.43
The body brought together COSATU, two smaller federations, Business Unity South
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Africa, representatives of government, and a selection of community organisations.
It provided the forum for the agreement of the South African 1995 Labour Relations Act,
which helped to strengthen conciliation and mediation structures. The initiative
represented an important attempt to facilitate and secure the transition. Talks involving
key political actors, unions and employers paralleled the national negotiations, and the
resultant understandings paved the way for formal negotiations at NEDLAC. This served
to make the negotiation process around the transition more broad based, and resolve key
concerns of unions and employers. The unions, above all, desired the repeal of the 1987
amendments to the Labour Relations Act that significantly rolled back worker rights.
Meanwhile, key employer concerns centred on the need for stability within the workplace
and beyond.
However, NEDLAC never succeeded in becoming a full neo-corporatist body;
agreements were episodic, and with the exception of the 1995 Act, very narrow ranging.
In June 2000, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) representative in South
Africa, Charles Nupen (who had earlier played a key role in developing structures for
mediation in South Africa) founded the Millennium Labour Council. This body brought
together business and labour, which, it was hoped, would reach agreements that could be
presented to NEDLAC as a fait accompli. Critics have charged that the Council led to a
depoliticising of controversial issues, removing pressure from government.44
The success, but also the failure of tripartism, can at least partly be attributed to
dominant partyism from 1994 onwards. On the one hand, dominant partyism led to
political stability, which was essential for tripartism. However, this strength also limited
the role of the union federation. As an Alliance partner with the ANC, COSATU had some
impact on government policy, but was primarily reactive, working to constrain neo-liberal
reforms, rather than forcing new policy initiatives. Despite this, COSATU’s rank and file
retained strong loyalty to the ANC, reflecting both historical sentiment and real progress in
basic service delivery.45 The emergence of alternative unions in recent years can be seen
as a reaction to COSATU’s orientation toward the ANC, whose members have been
accused of corruption and ignoring poverty.46 Yet, although the loyalty became more
conditional, it did not lead to rupture, nor to abandoning the alliance.47
Why has tripartism not been more effective in South Africa? Firstly, neither employers
nor unions were ever broadly encompassing organisations.48 A large proportion of the
South African workforce remained unorganised, and although there were strong ties
between the precariat and existing COSATU members via informal networks of support,
in the light of persistently high unemployment these networks came under increasing
strain. Secondly, some COSATU unions were in a weaker position vis-a`-vis key
employers than others; this resulted in diversity in priorities and organisational clout.49
Thirdly, and in common with other countries, employers have been divided, and smaller
employers have been suspicious of the motives of both unions and larger employers.50
Fourth, and more specific to South Africa, the resurgence in minerals prices, a general
return to growth across the economy, and political stability,51 may have removed the
underlying sense of urgency from the process. Fifth, in South Africa’s dominant party
system, internal coalition building has been subsumed into the ruling party rather than
being played out through genuine class coalition building.52 Years of exile and the
challenges of armed struggle led to the ANC developing a strong culture of internal
discipline and unity, which enabled it to survive and ride out a wide range of internal and
external challenges. Although this unity has become somewhat frayed in recent years, it
has remained highly effective in isolating and marginalising dissenters, enabling to it shore
up its dominance in the South Africa political order. Sixth, there have been structural
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changes in the composition of the political elite. Intellectuals were prominent in South
Africa’s first democratic government, which was characterised by a strong emphasis on
altruism and idealism, providing solid ground for class compromises.53 In subsequent
years, political entrepreneurs became more prominent,54 motivated by the pursuit of
wealth. Policies aimed at promoting black economic empowerment (BEE) have primarily
benefitted politically connected individuals, rather than contributing to broader
upliftment.55 Technocratic elites within government became fragmented, and some
became aligned with the agenda of global financial interests.56 Finally, the union
leadership also underwent changes. Some union leaders transformed themselves into
business magnates,57 while shop stewards moved into management. Although this trend
may seem common to other countries, this process was quite rapid in South Africa: from
the early to mid 1980s to the early to mid 1990s many employers went from strict anti-
union policies to actively seeking to bring shop stewards on board, in an attempt both to
drain workplace militancy and be seen to be actively advancing Africans as a remedy for
past injustice58 There was also evidence of a rupture between leadership and rank and file,
most notably in the mining industry; miners benefitted little from high minerals prices, but
union leaders, in some cases, became very close to management.59 In summary, the origins
of tripartism in South Africa were somewhat unique given the apartheid past, and the
causes of its failure were complex, but include dominant partyism, divided business
interests, political elites, and lack of union representation.
Namibia’s tripartism: reluctant partners?
Tripartism in Namibia largely stemmed from events in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
However, these developments were linked to the country’s past. South Africa’s colonial
rule in Namibia revolved fundamentally around the consolidation of its economic
dominance and the expansion of its political philosophy of racial segregation.60 A system of
contract migrant labour was established through stringent influx control measures, which
restricted access to the ‘white’ urban areas to black people who were born there or had lived
or worked continuously in the area for 10 or more years. Migrant workers were treated as
casual labourers and had to return to the bantustans at the end of their term of service.
Two-thirds of the labour force in Namibia was composed of migrants in the 1970s – a
higher proportion than almost anywhere else in the world, including South Africa itself.61
Wages of migrant workers were unilaterally fixed by labour recruitment agencies at a
uniformly low level for all economic sectors. The migrant labour system was both a vital
component of South Africa’s occupation of Namibia and a source of deep resentment
among black workers.
As the struggle for national liberation gathered momentum, a range of draconian
security laws passed by the South African government after 1948 were extended to
Namibia. The banning of persons and publications; the harassment, detention and torture
of political activists; the prohibition on public meetings; and the general suppression
of oppositional activity authorised by these laws had deleterious consequences for the
normal activities associated with trade unionism. While trade unions organised by and
for African workers were not unlawful, they were assigned to ‘an institutional vacuum’.62
In summary, the pre-independence system of labour regulation consisted of three
components: formal and statutory law for the private sector; informal and mainly non-
statutory regulations for the agricultural and domestic service sectors, informal sector and
unregistered trade unions and employers’ organisations; and the limitation of collective
employment relations to isolated instances of consultation within the public sector.63
466 P. Dibben et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 07
:35
 12
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
From the late 1970s, it became clear that the apartheid labour market had impeded
mobility and generated extensive opposition from semi- and unskilled black workers. The
need for deracialisation influenced the policies of the interim Transitional Government of
National Unity and the resurgent activism of the National Union of Namibian Workers
(NUNW). However, most employers generally clung to established workplace structures
and practices.64 After independence in 1990, Namibia’s socio-economic structure was
marked by: an underdeveloped rural sector, especially in the populous north; a small
industrial sector dominated by the production and export of a few primary products with
minimal processing; a capital-intensive production structure; a severe shortage of skilled
labour and high rates of illiteracy among the black population; a small domestic market;
negative growth rates of real Gross National Income; and a high degree of dependence on
the South African economy. This latter feature was deliberately put into place by the South
African regime before independence.65 Under these conditions, as a World Bank report
concluded, ‘the intriguing question is not why is the Namibian manufacturing sector so
small, but why does it exist at all’.66
In terms of the labour movement, enduring trade unions began to emerge in the
mid-1980s.67 Namibia’s largest and most influential trade union federation, the NUNW,
which was formerly established in 1989, prioritised the struggle for national liberation
over the improvement of employment conditions under the colonial system, and
essentially operated as the labour wing of South West African People’s Organization
(SWAPO) in exile.68 These deep, historical links are evidenced by the NUNW’s direct
affiliation to SWAPO, a relationship that inhibited NUNW’s independence, articulation of
its own policy positions, and criticism of the government.69
The SWAPO government was compelled to establish tripartite structures in an effort
to: (1) incorporate the labour movement which had contributed toward the struggle for
independence and had become increasingly militant during the late 1980s; and (2) assure
organised business of protected interests and involvement in the post-independence
economy.Although aware of structural unemployment and low growth rates and inequalities,
SWAPO was not able to restructure the labour market or break economic neo-colonial ties,
and instead moved toward the creation of a favourable economic climate for foreign direct
investment. TheNamibian Employers’ Federation’s (NEF) positionwas largely pragmatic: it
sought to influence the programmes of the SWAPO-dominated government, safeguard the
economic privileges of the prevailing elite, and gain access to a national platform to promote
socio-economic reforms that might lead to productivity and competitiveness.
In practice, the first tripartite structure was the Commission of Enquiry into Labour
Matters in 1987. The NUNW also participated in the drafting of the Constitution of the
Republic of Namibia. After independence, and influenced by the ILO, the SWAPO
government more fully committed itself to the principles of tripartism,70 with tripartite
principles and discussions being applied to all ratified Conventions and related legislation.
Given the close structural links between the NUNW and SWAPO as well as the key roles
played by union leaders in the party, there was a widespread expectation that the interests
of workers would figure prominently in SWAPO’s policies. SWAPO relied on union
support during Namibia’s first democratic elections, and moves to tripartism in the post
independence era represented a vital reciprocal gesture. Tripartism would facilitate in
deepening dialogue between employers and unions, reducing the chance of destabilising
industrial disputes in the post-independence era. In other words, the post-independence
tripartite initiative may have helped to smooth and secure the transition. Indeed, the 1992
Labour Act represented a significant advance over the labour relations system in colonial
Namibia, setting up institutions that were designed to promote and consolidate tripartism
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in employment relations. Principal among these institutions was the Labour Advisory
Council (LAC) which was comprised of representatives from government, registered
employers’ organisations and registered trade unions, tasked with advising the Minister of
Labour on ‘any labour-related matters’, and aimed to promote tripartism in order to create
employment relations conducive to economic growth, stability and productivity.71 The
LAC set up committees to investigate issues such as the formulation and implementation
of national policy, the promotion of collective bargaining, and the collecting and
publishing of labour-related statistics. Most of the committees did not meet regularly, but
recommended amendments to the Labour Act and social security legislation. The LAC
thus appears to have played an important role, although one that was quite circumscribed.
The Labour Act also established a range of tripartite institutions: the Wages
Commission which set minimum wages in designated sectors of the economy; a tripartite
Social Security Commission; the Labour Court and district Labour Courts, whose
assessors could be appointed in equal numbers from representatives of trade unions and
employers’ organisations; and the Presidential Economic Advisory Council, National
Planning Commission and Employment Equity Commission. Finally, the office of the
Labour Commissioner was established to facilitate ‘healthy’ employment relations
between the social partners. However, while the government consulted with labour and
capital on a range of labour relations and socio-economic issues, it reserved the right to
make the final decision if no consensus was reached, acting as a ‘neutral referee’ and
creator of an enabling environment for collective employment relations.72
From the outset, there were a number of tensions and problems associated with
tripartism in Namibia, which contributed toward its limited role. First, tripartism only
accommodated members of registered trade unions, thus excluding the majority of workers
in Namibia, including those in communal agriculture, the informal sector, and unorganised
workers in the formal sector. Second, while tripartism presupposed government interaction
with two distinct ‘social partners’, the government was the largest employer in the formal
sector, and the NUNW federation was affiliated to the ruling party in government. From
independence to 2009, SWAPO effectively attained one-party rule, with around 75% of the
vote. Third, the NUNW-affiliated unions lacked influence, particularly since the
government increasingly embraced neo-liberal ideas, and sought to encourage foreign
investors at the cost of the unions. This can be illustrated by the controversial Export
Processing Act of 1995. In its original form, the government took the decision to make
export processing zones (EPZs) ‘trade union free zones’ by declaring the Labour Act (1992)
non-applicable. This meant that trade unions would not be able to exercise their basic right
of collective bargaining with employers. It was only after the NUNW threatened to take the
government to court, claiming that the EPZ Bill was a violation of the Labour Act, the
Constitution and several ratified ILO Conventions, that the government (and SWAPO)
entered into discussions with the NUNW. Following these discussions, a relatively minor
compromise was reached: the Labour Act would apply, but with strikes and lockouts
outlawed, and all disputes being subject to compulsory arbitration – a major set of labour
rights denials.73 Fourth, the tripartite structures were largely advisory in nature, and
composed of a majority of non-union representatives. At its second National Congress, the
NUNW adopted a resolution that denounced the government’s neo-liberal stance that the
latter had taken in order to please the World Bank, IMF and foreign investors, and that
criticised the federation’s lack of involvement in policy formulation.74 Fifth, the power of
trade unions was compromised by high levels of unemployment, deep social divisions, a
demobilised civil society, and a preponderance of decentralised collective bargaining.75
Decentralised bargaining resulted in the unions spending the bulk of their time and meagre
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resources on a multitude of separate negotiations with predominantly small companies.
Added to this were a lack of resources and negotiating ability, with trade union leaders being
drawn into senior positions in the public and private sectors, leading to the appointment of
new leaders with little knowledge of workplace issues and socioeconomic policies.76 There
was also declining accountability within the unions, with a reduction in report-backs to
members before major decisions were taken.77
Sixth, the role of the employer federations was limited. With the exception of the
Chamber of Mines and the Master Builders’ Association, employers lacked a central,
organised presence in the regulation of labour market issues, perhaps since labour lacked
influence which reduced the need to engage. The lack of employer engagement weakened
tripartism, ruled out centralised collective bargaining and contributed towards the increasing
variation in terms and conditions of employment within and between different economic
sectors. Moreover, employers in Namibia were historically opposed to negotiating with
union representatives, preferring to consult with committees of their own creation.78
Although the NEF represented employers in the LAC and in the various tripartite committees
established by the LAC, and repeatedly stressed its commitment to tripartism as a principle
of democracy, it also repeatedly expressed reservations about the efficacy and purpose of the
LAC.79 In addition, the NEF accepted LAC decisions even if they did not agree with them.80
For example, amendments to the Labour Act in 2007 (such as extended leave provisions for
employees, the banning of temporary employment agencies, and a clause that prohibited
representation at arbitration meetings and compelled employers to attend them personally)
were made despite the lack of consensus among the social partners. In the words of the
NEF’s president: ‘We put our concerns to the nation’s policymakers, but it is a pity that the
concept of tripartism . . . was completely jettisoned in the promulgation of this Act.’81
Seventh, there were challenges related to the polity. There was increased
marginalisation of dissenting views and the intolerance of criticism, in Namibia as
elsewhere in the region, with origins in the liberation struggle.82 As Saunders commented,
‘The centrality of the armed struggle in the years of exile meant that SWAPO became
dominated by a military culture, strongly hierarchical, authoritarian and closed.’83 And as
previously noted, militarised elites are unlikely to have much interest in forging cross class
compromises.84 Finally, given its history of institutionalised oppression and discrimi-
nation, employment relations in Namibia were characterised by a fundamental lack of trust
and willingness to compromise.85 In practice, according to union leaders, ‘the principles of
tripartism are currently not being sustained or enforced by the Namibian Government.’86
The choice confronting the government, business and labour in Namibia in the future is
arguably a low-wage, low-skill, deregulated and fragmented framework that emphasises the
need to attract foreign investment and reduce social spending, versus a high-wage, high-skill,
centralised and co-determinist framework in which employee participation and training are
seen as vital for increasing the productivity of the economy. The former route is likely to be
adversarial in nature and divisive in its consequences, while the latter is likely to encourage
investment in human resources and expand the terrain for tripartite decision-making.The low-
wage route would place additional strains on the coalition between SWAPO and the NUNW
and halt, if not reverse, the efforts to expand democracy and reduce social inequalities.
Mozambique: a partnership of equals?
Aswith SouthAfrica andNamibia, the effectiveness of tripartism inMozambique cannot be
divorced from the country’s past. From 1498 until 1975, Portuguese colonialists in
Mozambique concentrated on the extraction of raw materials and forced labour.87 In this
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respect, Mozambique was similar to a number of other colonised countries.88 By the
nineteenth century, efforts had turned toward building infrastructure and encouraging
enterprise, but the regime still engaged in forced labour (particularly in relation to cotton),
racism and state neglect of the large peasant population.89 A war of independence ended
in 1975, with a vast exodus of Portuguese settlers,90 leaving important skills gaps in the
economy. Driven by the need to coordinate economic reconstruction, and sponsored by
the Soviet Union, the new revolutionary government, Frelimo, embraced single party
socialism. However, the country was soon plunged into a bloody civil war, with the peasant
based rebel movement, Renamo, drawing support from those hostile to the abolishment of
chiefly authority and heavy handed agrarian policies, and enjoying backing from first the
Rhodesian government and subsequently apartheid South Africa.91 The war ended in 1992
(the end of apartheid paving the way for a negotiated settlement), and democratic elections
were first held in 1994. The ruling party Frelimo formed the government, with Renamo in
opposition. From the late 1980s onwards, Frelimo distanced itself from socialism due to the
withdrawal of Soviet aid, and turned to the IMF andWorld Bank,92 which, in turn, gave aid
on condition that the government reduced spending, liberalised the economy, and privatised
state owned enterprises.93 These strategies contributed toward massive job losses.
Employment legislation was developed by the Portuguese, then revised through the Labour
Laws of 1998 and 2007; the government adopted all of the International Core Labour
Standards.94 However, the enforcement of legislation was problematic, resulting in calls for
changes in pay, health and safety and representation of the informal sector.95Moreover, only
20% of workers have generally been covered by collective agreements.96
Unions existed before independence in 1975, but workers had to be earning over a certain
wage before they could qualify to be members, which disqualified most black workers.
During the early socialist period, the state set up production councils which consisted of both
workers and Frelimo activists;97 dynamising groups were set up by the government to
promote the party and maintain production, or emerged spontaneously,98 and later these
groups were formed into party cells.99 In 1983, production councils were merged into the
union federation, Organizaca˜o dos Trabalhadores de Mocambique (‘OTM’, the
Organisation of Mozambican Workers), and union membership was made compulsory for
workers in industry and services, following the Soviet transmission belt model.100 By 1985,
the OTMhad begun to create national unions to represent different sectors, and by 1993 there
were 15 unions. Following Frelimo’s gradual abandonment of state socialism, new statutes
were passed at the OTM conference in 1990 making the union officially independent of any
political party. Moreover, as confirmed by the trade union freedom act in 1991, union
membership wasmade voluntary and available to anyone earning a salary or wage.101 By the
beginning of the 1990s, themore independentOTMhad begun to criticise government policy
on structural adjustment,102 and wildcat strikes took place in 1990, protesting against
structural adjustment and lowwages.103 However, the federation was still generally regarded
as too close to the rulingparty, and in1998 three trade unions left theOTMand instead formed
the Confederation of Free and Independent Trade Unions ofMozambique (CONSILMO).104
Why did Mozambique embark on tripartism when it did? Tripartism in Mozambique
was instigated by the government post 1994, but built on the legacy of previous forms of
corporatism, including those drawn from the colonial power: in Portugal, authoritarian
corporatist rule under the Estado Novo emphasised unity between state and society,
drawing on Portuguese legal tradition and patriarchal elements of Portuguese culture;105
in 1960s Mozambique, facets of Portuguese authoritarian corporatism had led to the
encompassing of both larger employer interests and white dominated trade
unions. Another reason might have been Frelimo’s wish to exclude Renamo from
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decision-making, so that it could claim full credit for the peace dividend.106 Hence, the
type of tripartism that emerged in Mozambique was one that cemented the hegemony of
the ruling party. A further explanation related to the government’s desire to secure support
from both unions and employers. The main site of opposition to the Frelimo government
was the rural periphery, where union penetration was slight; in contrast, through the 1990s,
it retained strong support amongst the urban working class.107 Promoting deals with
increasingly independently minded unions could help to draw them back into the fold.
In other words, from Frelimo’s point of view, tripartite initiatives may have made
democratisation less risky. It represented an important concession to unions that could help
promote support among their constituents, who, in turn, represented a vital pool of voters
for the ruling party. Again, giving employers a say in macro policy decision-making would
reduce the possibilities of them seeking to reach accommodations with their own
independent unions, and enhance their ties with government. For employers, given the
country’s troubled history, tripartism offered the potential for economic and social
stability.
A key structure within Mozambique’s tripartite arrangements was the Consultative
Labour Commission (CCT), whichwas established in 1994, and consisted of the government,
the employer’s organisation the CTA (Confederaca˜o das Associaco˜es Econo´micas de
Mocambique) and both the OTM andCONSILMOunion federations.108 The CCT’s aimwas
to ‘promote discussion and consultation on issues related to the country’s governance, labour
market and social and economic policies as they relate to employment.’109 Items for
discussion in the CCT included the setting of the minimum wage, review of the labour law,
and vocational training.110 However, according to the ILO, limiting the CCT’s effectiveness
were weaknesses in the tripartite partners’ negotiating abilities and research capacity, and a
lack of dialogue between national and provincial levels.111
In terms of the labour movement’s level of influence within the tripartite system, it has
been suggested on the one hand that, ‘labor unions do exert pressure on the government to
maintain some extremely pro-worker provisions in labor legislation,’ including influence
in relation to the recruitment and dismissal of Mozambicans, severance payments and
other benefits.112 Although the government tried to reduce severance pay, under pressure
from the World Bank and IMF, the OTM managed to persuade the CTA that previous
rights should be kept, otherwise it would cause industrial conflict.113 On the other hand,
the federation has not achieved freedom of association for public sector workers,114 a
significant rise in the minimum wage, or reductions in unemployment and inequality.115
Its effectiveness has been limited by its lack of independence from the government. Since
it was set up by the ruling party, the federation has struggled to bargain and negotiate with
government, a weakness that has been echoed in other post-colonial states.116 More
generally, their role has been affected by an inability to represent workers at the
workplace: it has failed to establish collective bargaining at industry level, and employers
have not complied with collective agreements.117 In common with other countries, there
has also been evidence of victimisation of union members and restrictions placed on union
activity,118 while organising has been prevented due to the lack of funds, problems in
reaching workers in rural areas,119 and difficulties in organising workers in small firms.120
Although there have been some signs of mobilisation, including strikes in state run
enterprises and large foreign firms,121 representation of informal sector workers has been
limited to the OTM helping Associaca˜o dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector
Informal (ASSOTSI), the organisation representing informal sector workers, to voice its
concerns to government.122
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The role of employers within the tripartite arrangement has also been complex.
The main employer’s federation, the CTA, was set up in 1996 and by 2012 consisted of
64 members.123 Although referring to itself as non partisan, it was set up by the donor
agency USAID which encouraged it to take more neo-liberal views (freer trade and
greater competition) than many of its (particularly domestic) members desired.124 In
addition to engaging in tripartism, the CTA has also engaged with the state in a range of
forums outside the CCT, including the Extensive Consultative Council (CAC Conselho
Alargado de Consulta) – a forum which excludes trade union bodies – where items for
discussion have included: reductions in taxes and tariffs, funds to support industry, and
perhaps surprisingly, the need to enforce labour legislation to protect miners, domestic
and rural workers.125 The government has also independently consulted the CTA on
trade agreements, skills training and licensing requirements,126 and worked closely with
large foreign investors.127 The OTM appears to have had far less opportunity to meet
with the government independently of employers, although as a member of the National
Insurance Commission it has been consulted on issues such as the privatisation
process.128
Constraints on the effectiveness of tripartism also relate to the nature of the state,
which in Mozambique has been party dominated.129 Frelimo’s proportion of the vote
increased since 1994 from 44% of the vote,130 to over 70% of the vote in 2008.131 After a
tenuous hold on power, Frelimo has re-secured its position as the dominant party in
Mozambican politics. As with SWAPO in Namibia, Frelimo’s militaristic internal culture
and a strong prioritisation of internal unity may have helped paper over internal
differences, helping to secure its status as the party of government.
At the same time, Renamo became increasingly fragmented, with weak local
structures, and very limited resources,132 although retaining support from voters in the
central provinces.133 The gradual decline in opposition support can be ascribed to
Renamo’s in-fighting, while state and party lines have remained blurred, allowing for the
co-optation of some opposition figures. In late 2013, Renamo abandoned the political
system altogether and returned to war;134 underlying this decision appears to be a desire to
gain a stake in the rents flowing from the country’s hydrocarbons boom. Despite Renamo’s
ability to disrupt transport and communications in its central rural heartland, Frelimo
remains firmly ensconced across most of the country.
In Mozambique, political elites have undeniably had a difficult role in balancing
the different interests of donors, civil servants, civil society organisations, the technical elite
and emerging economic elite.135 In addition, the persistent disparagement of the worth
of government by donors, the loss of ideological purpose, and the opportunities
for enrichment opened up by privatisation have led to high levels of corruption by sections
of the ruling elite.136Moreover,World Bank and IMF conditions have undermined tripartism
due to reductions in the size of the state and the power of labour throughmechanisms such as
privatisation, and the reduced coherence of national business through liberalisation.
Mozambique has enjoyed a return to growth from the late 1990s onwards, reflecting
rising primary commodity prices, and the reconstruction of its transport sector; the
country’s locale and good natural harbours makes it a major outlet for minerals and other
primary exports from across southern Africa.137 In common with other countries, it may
also have benefited from the diaspora funding capital investment.138 Yet, Mozambique has
similar constraints on tripartism to South Africa and Namibia, due to dominant partyism,
a lack of representativeness of labour and capital, under-resourced trade unions, and
political elites, and coupled with this has been the legacy of both its colonial and post-
socialist history.
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Conclusion
At the time of writing, tripartism in southern Africa has not lived up to its ideal, which is
arguably not surprising, given the global trend in the decline of trade unionmembership and
influence.139 At the same time, it can be noted that the tripartite arrangements engaged in by
the three case study countries have led to some success in terms of advancing worker rights.
The origins of tripartism were somewhat different in each case. In South Africa, the strong
labour movement, employers, and government were keen to embrace tripartism after the
ending of apartheid. In Namibia, tripartite structures were implemented by government, but
influenced by the ILO. InMozambique, the post-socialist government sought to engage key
urban-based social partners in discussions around specific social and economic policy areas,
whilst facilitating the marginalisation of the often opposition-supporting rural periphery.
Can the modes used be described as neo-corporatist tripartism? At the minimum, neo-
corporatist tripartism assumes reconciling the interests of competing classes, and
compromises between capital and labour, underpinned by state support.140 There is little
doubt that, in all three countries, the principal unions and employers came to a working
modus operandi, and this helped underpin political and economic stability, recent
disturbances in the South African mines and in central Mozambique notwithstanding. Yet,
persistent inequality and limitations in broad based economic growth in all three countries
suggests that it has not achieved the desired outcomes.141
The weaknesses in tripartism reflect four underlying issues. The first is the global
hegemonyofneo-liberalism,making it verydifficult to reachabroadbasednational consensus
around alternatives, apart from in times of grave crisis.142 In practice, tripartite deal making
focused on a limited range of areas concerned with the regulation of work and employment;
in otherwords, the scope formore ambitious deal-makingwas circumscribed.Another reason
for the exclusion of contentious and potentially divisive matters such as economic, monetary
and industrial policies from tripartite negotiations has been due to the voluntarist labour
relations systems of South Africa and Namibia. Here, the withdrawal of employers’
organisations from tripartite structures is a real and continuous challenge to labour and the
government. Yet, some forms of consensus have been reached: in Mozambique, the neo-
liberal agenda has been alleviated by post-socialist tendencies among both of the social
partners, leading to some removal of worker rights (in respect of redundancy), but also
advances in other (admittedly individualised) areas such as maternity leave.
The second, related, issue is that all three countries have enjoyed good economic
performance in recent years, supported by minerals and other primary commodities.
Although there has been only limited ‘trickle down’ in terms of benefits to the poor, the
prospect for upward social mobility and extensive clientist networks may have relieved
mass pressures towards meaningful economic alternatives – although recent strikes,
particularly within the mining and manufacturing sectors in South Africa, and protests
about food prices in Mozambique show the potential for civil unrest. Thirdly, the tripartite
partners have not represented the majority of either workers or businesses, since the large
informal sector workforce (not to mention the large cohort of unemployed) and small and
micro enterprises have remained largely outside of negotiations. This has made it very
difficult for deals between large firms, and the unions representing their workers to gain
broader acceptance and legitimacy. Although in Mozambique, ASSOTSI, representing
informal sector workers, is an affiliate of the OTM federation, it has not been an equal
partner in negotiations;143 moreover, tripartite deals have shut out representation from
opposition strongholds on the rural periphery. Fourthly, each country has had a dominant
party system during recent years. Within these ruling parties, politicians have used their
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political connections to leverage state concessions and/or gain stakes in privatised state
enterprises on preferential terms. This trend arguably reflects the passing of the idealistic
liberation generation and the rich opportunities opened for enrichment by privatisation and
indigenisation policies.
Yet, the importance of tripartite initiatives should not be forgotten. Most importantly,
they may have eased political transitions in all three countries where, at the time of
democratisation, political institutions were fluid and the future uncertain. This led to interest
groupings being strongly concerned to secure their positions through compromises. Indeed,
it can be argued that moves to tripartism helped to smooth and secure democratic transitions
in South Africa and Namibia, ensuring not only that unions made real gains from the
transition, but also that employers were assured of stability. In the case of Mozambique, it
may have helped Frelimo bolster up its urban working class support, making democratisation
less risky for the ruling party. However, as the new political institutions became embedded,
key players seem to have been less likely to countenance compromise.
Some elements of tripartism remain in all three countries, promising some degree of
political and social stability. For labour, inclusion within policy debates may result in
some influence on social and economic growth. Moreover, businesses rely on concessions
and incentives that might be assisted by their close relationship to political elites, and at
the same time, pressure on employers from unions and the state can help to ensure that the
agenda of more responsible and committed employers gains the upper hand. In the
countries under study, there remain deep cleavages, such as income inequality, rural/urban
divides and racial divisions that can only be resolved through historic accommodations.
This article raises two broader questions. The first is whether successful examples of
tripartism represented the product of unique historical circumstances that are not easily
replicable. The tripartism that emerged and persisted through much of Western Europe
during the cold war may have been the product of a very specific set of conditions,
reflecting both the sustained nature of the long boom – making for a reliably expanding
pool of resources to share – and also underlying capitalist-elite concerns, that if the
working class did not share in some of the benefits they would defect to communism.
This does not necessarily mean that the experience of Western Europe was an historical
anomaly, and hence, that tripartism arrangements cannot be replicated in different
circumstances. Rather, as Djelic notes,144 institutional arrangements represent past
historical circumstances, choices of actors, and the extent to which differing institutional
spheres overlap, coexist and are compatible. Hence, institutional arrangements arise from
heterogeneous activities, involving different actors with very different concerns and
agendas.145 The possibility of different combinations may not mean that tripartism cannot
be replicated, but instead implies that different forms of tripartism might emerge.
The types of tripartite arrangements that emerged in South Africa were very different to
those that were historically encountered in Western Europe. For example, none of the key
players – dominant political parties, unions and employer associations – were genuinely
encompassing.146 Moreover, the nature of the industrial relations systems in the three
developing countries has influenced the effectiveness of tripartism. The adversarial
bargaining practices and fragmented bargaining structures in the three countries –
Namibia and Mozambique are predominantly decentralised, while South Africa is mixed
– has influenced the form and functions of tripartism. Unlike Western Europe, tripartism
in these southern African countries was never premised on a sustained articulation
between organisational and institutional forces at the national, regional and local levels.
Under these circumstances, centralised tripartite structures operated largely in the absence
of clear, binding mandates.
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Indeed, the existing literature on tripartism in the developing world suggests that
tripartism in such contexts is rather different to that encountered in the developed world.
It can be argued that in the developing world, a major achievement of tripartite
experiments has not so much been to underpin far reaching social compromises, but to
mitigate the worst effects of neo-liberalism.147 Hence, even though the social conditions
encountered in post-WW2 Europe may have been relatively unique, and a Fordist
Keynesian deal was never on the agenda, even incomplete and partial tripartite
experiments have yielded worthwhile gains in the developing world. In all three
countries – but particularly South Africa and Namibia – this is certainly true; the
negotiated labour dispensations represented real gains for workers, and served to alleviate
pressures to greater labour market deregulation. Having said this, in the context of a
developing country, tripartite arrangements contain extensive limits on the degree of
transformation possible: radical change is constantly undermined by the international
mobility of capital and its unwillingness to engage in hostile or inimical policymaking
forums. Moreover, there are many other players – SMEs and their employees, the
informal sector, workers belonging to new breakaway unions and illegal immigrants
(in the case of South Africa) and other casual and precarious workers, and the large
number of unemployed – who would need to have some stake in any deal for it to be
sustainable and broadly beneficial. This suggests that the negotiations behind any social
accord would be more challenging; at the same time, there are many who would have a
genuine interest in a compromise, given their present marginalisation, whilst more
established interest groupings would benefit from enhanced prospects of longer term
sustainable growth. In southern Africa, much of the growth has been on the back of
buoyant commodity markets, making for greater economic volatility. On the one hand,
this has meant that in recent years, growth has come despite internal economic choices,
reducing pressures on governments to promote more inclusive economic policies or
promote diversification. On the other hand, endemic volatility in commodity prices
makes it difficult to plan for the future; the recent (2014) crisis of emerging market
currencies highlights the urgency of reaching broader based accommodations that
involve not only political, but also economic compromise.
The second broader question is whether tripartism is really possible within dominant
party systems. Within them, the ruling party may be very selective in the type of
compromise it seeks to promote, with the exclusion of key interest groupings such as
informal sector workers and the urban poor, leading to the active promotion of non-
encompassing tripartism, which, in turn, brings its own contradictions. In other words, it
can safely disregard a significant component of the electorate, given the ruling party’s
capacity to dominate the media, the state and security forces, and/or through the ability of
it and key financial backers to buy off or at least sit out serious challengers. In all three
countries, the basis for dominant partyism was laid in long armed liberation struggles; not
only did the latter impart a strong sense of historical legitimacy onto the main liberation
movement, but also an embedded (and at times militaristic or quasi-militaristic) culture of
internal politics made it easier to secure primacy and marginalise dissenters following
liberation. Dominant partyism is not a phenomenon unique to southern Africa, and may be
encountered in many other countries that underwent protracted liberation struggles.
However, as Solinger notes, dominant party arrangements are never totally durable, which
may provide some incentive for political elites to extend some concessions from a position
of relative strength.148 The remaining question is whether the labour movement can grasp
these opportunities.
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